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FEDERAL COURTS 
CAN’T SOLVE OUR 
EDUCATION ILLS
by ALFRED A. LINDSETH, 
ROCCO E. TESTANI,  
and LEE A. PEIFER
INEQUITABLE  
SCHOOLS DEMAND  
A FEDERAL REMEDY  
by CHARLES J. OGLETREE JR.  
and  KIMBERLY JENKINS ROBINSON
IT IS NOT OFTEN that the U.S. Supreme Court admits 
that one of its previous decisions, especially one that shaped 
the fabric of our nation, was fundamentally wrong. One 
such instance occurred in 1954, when the court famously 
declared, in Brown v. Board of Education, that the doctrine 
of “separate but equal” public schools for black children and 
white children was unconstitutional. In Brown, the court 
overturned, for public schools, its approval of this doctrine 
in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) and 
IN 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal 
Constitution does not establish a fundamental right to 
education or to “equal” school funding. In so doing, the 
court rejected the argument that funding disparities across 
local school districts should be “strictly scrutinized” under 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause. 
That decision, in San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez, has been good law for more than 40 years.
Various commentators and 
Does the U.S. Constitution guarantee a right to education? It does not, the Supreme Court declared 
in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, a 1973 case alleging that disparities in 
spending levels among Texas school districts violated students’ constitutional rights. In this issue’s 
forum, Charles Ogletree, Harvard Law School professor, and Kimberly Robinson, professor at the 
University of Richmond School of Law, assert that the court should overturn the Rodriguez decision, 
thus opening the door to federal remedies to public-education inequality. On the other side, Alfred A. 
Lindseth, Rocco E. Testani, and Lee A. Peifer, attorneys at the law firm Eversheds Sutherland (US), 
contend that a reversal of Rodriguez would lead not to educational parity but to endless litigation. 
RODRIGUEZ RECONSIDERED:  
Is  There a Federal Constitutional  
Right to Education?
( continued on page 73)(continued on page 72)
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established that segregated schools 
violated the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
court also proclaimed that educational 
“opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a 
right which must be made available to all on equal terms.” 
Less than two decades later, however, the court turned its back 
on protecting a right to equal educational opportunity. In San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973), the court 
held that the Constitution does not protect a right to education. 
This decision foreclosed a federal judicial remedy for disparities 
in funding that had relegated Mexican 
American children in the predominantly 
low-income Edgewood Independent 
School District of San Antonio, Texas, 
to an education that was inferior to that 
of students in the city’s affluent, mostly 
white Alamo Heights district. The two 
districts differed in their ability to raise 
property taxes because of significant 
disparities in property values in the two 
communities. Edgewood adopted the 
highest tax rate in the area but yielded 
the least funding for its schools, while 
Alamo Heights adopted a substantially 
lower tax rate that yielded consider-
ably more per-pupil funding. Plaintiffs 
alleged, in part, that these funding dis-
parities denied them their constitutional 
right to education. All children must 
be guaranteed that right, they argued, 
because education equips citizens to 
fully enjoy their free speech and voting 
rights. 
In a 5–4 decision, the court dis-
agreed. Rodriguez held that the 
Constitution does not explicitly or 
implicitly guarantee a right to educa-
tion. The court denied that it had the authority or the ability 
to guarantee people “the most effective speech or the most 
informed electoral choice.” It said further that affirming a con-
stitutional right to education would greatly disturb the balance 
of education federalism that embraced primary state and local 
control for education—an important means for encouraging 
innovation, experimentation, and competition between states. 
The court also claimed that it was not qualified to address dif-
ficult empirical questions such as whether money influenced 
educational quality. And since the plaintiffs had not alleged that 
they were denied the “basic minimal skills” required to enjoy the 
right to free speech and to vote, the court said it did not need to 
determine if the Constitution guaranteed a right to an education 
that provides such skills. 
Parallels to Plessy
Rodriguez will one day be considered as erroneous as the court’s 
approval of the “separate but equal” doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson, 
for three reasons. 
First, just as the states refused to make good on the “equal” 
part of “separate but equal” after Plessy, for more than 40 years 
states have failed to provide equal access to the funding needed 
to achieve excellent schools for all children, largely because of a 
lack of federal accountability for equitable school funding. The 
Rodriguez court acknowledged the need for state tax reform 
related to school funding and for “innovative thinking as to public 
education, its methods, and its funding.” 
However, the court was unwilling to 
order states to engage in this reform. 
Instead, the court explained that any 
solutions to these challenges must be 
determined by state lawmakers and 
those who elect them. Although some 
states have undertaken school funding 
reform since Rodriguez, too many do 
not provide the funding systems that 
excellent and equitable schools demand. 
Evidence abounds regarding the 
harmful nature of funding disparities. 
For example, the U.S. Department 
of Education’s Equity and Excellence 
Commission found in its 2013 report 
that “students, families and communi-
ties are burdened by the broken system 
of education funding in America.” State 
funding systems are not closely linked to 
desired educational outcomes: despite 
the fact that all states have adopted 
educational standards, the commis-
sion found that only a few states have 
developed funding systems that enable 
schools to teach all students the content 
of state standards. 
Although scholars do not agree on what constitutes an appro-
priate minimum funding level, studies that attempt to determine 
such sums find that many states fund schools below those levels. 
Nor do states provide effective oversight of funding to ensure that 
it is used efficiently to meet student needs. Equality eluded genera-
tions of African Americans in part because of Plessy. Similarly, 
many schoolchildren today attend schools that lack sufficient and 
equitable funding in part because of Rodriguez, which foreclosed 
the federal judicial accountability that could require states to 
remedy their inequitable funding disparities. 
Second, just as Plessy relegated African Americans to second-
class status, Rodriguez relegates many students to second-class 
status. It is beyond dispute that, because disadvantaged children 
come to their classrooms with an (continued on page 74)
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two new lawsuits, however, argue 
that Rodriguez should be recon-
sidered. These advocates urge the 
courts to create a federal consti-
tutional right to education. Although the word “education” 
appears nowhere in the federal Constitution, advocates for 
recognizing that such a right is implied typically argue that 
it would ensure “equal educational opportunity” and foster 
more effective participation in civil society. These advocates 
may be well-intentioned, but their arguments rest on shaky 
legal reasoning and would translate into bad policy. 
First, as a matter of constitutional 
law, Rodriguez was correctly decided. 
With a nod to Brown v. Board of 
Education, the Supreme Court’s 1954 
decision banning state-imposed racial 
segregation in schools, the Rodriguez 
court recognized “the vital role of 
education in a free society.” But the 
court also emphasized the restraint 
inherent in our federal constitu-
tional scheme: “The importance of a 
service performed by the State does 
not determine whether it must be 
regarded as fundamental for pur-
poses of examination under the Equal 
Protection Clause,” the court wrote in 
its opinion, and “education, of course, 
is not among the rights afforded 
explicit protection under our Federal 
Constitution. Nor do we find any basis 
for saying it is implicitly so protected.” 
And finally, the court noted, “it is not 
the province of this Court to create 
substantive constitutional rights in the 
name of guaranteeing equal protec-
tion of the laws.” 
This analysis reflects the fact that 
the federal Constitution protects us 
from certain kinds of governmental 
action—such as state-imposed segregation, prohibitions on 
free speech, or invasions of personal privacy—but does not 
create expansive positive rights or guarantee governmental 
assistance. Federal courts typically refuse to create new sub-
stantive rights, and in a 1989 case, DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court 
“recognized that the [Constitution’s] Due Process Clauses 
generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, 
even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or 
property interests.” Declaring education to be an implicit fun-
damental right would raise difficult constitutional questions 
about essentials such as food, shelter, and health care—none 
of which are mentioned in the federal Constitution.
More broadly, the federal government was designed to 
have limited, enumerated powers, as reflected in the Tenth 
Amendment: “The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” 
Regardless of the incentives contained in federal laws like 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that the federal government may 
encourage but may not simply “commandeer” state govern-
ments to implement or enforce federal policies.
These constitutional principles are 
especially important in the context 
of education. Historically, responsi-
bility for designing and reforming 
systems of public education has 
rested with the states. Unlike the 
federal Constitution, all 50 state 
constitutions have provisions that 
explicitly address education. Many 
of these provisions speak merely 
in broad terms, but they still serve 
as points of reference for state and 
local governments charged with 
establishing and maintaining public 
schools. Legal challenges to a state’s 
legislative and executive policies on 
public education necessarily impli-
cate separation-of-powers concerns 
about the courts’ abilities to answer 
political questions and resolve policy 
debates. But at least state courts have 
an education clause to begin their 
analysis of any right to education.
By contrast, given the lack of an edu-
cation clause in the U.S. Constitution, 
federal courts attempting to define 
an implicit right to education would 
need to start from scratch. Without 
the benefit of any constitutional text 
or interpretive history to lend meaning to the term “education,” 
federal courts would be fabricating a new substantive right out 
of whole cloth.
Misguided Efforts
Yet advocates of a federal right to education continue their 
efforts to overturn or reinterpret Rodriguez. Within the past year, 
plaintiffs in Connecticut and Michigan have filed new lawsuits 
imploring federal courts to recognize a federal constitutional 
right to education. The Connecticut plaintiffs, in Martinez v. 
Malloy, hope to expand school-choice (continued on page 75)
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array of educational and personal chal-
lenges, they need additional resources 
to compete successfully with their 
more-affluent peers. Therefore, even 
when states provide equal per-pupil funding for all students, 
low-income children and communities remain disadvantaged. 
A recent Education Law Center report found that in 2013, 18 
states provided essentially the same funding to districts with high 
and low concentrations of disadvantaged students. Only 16 states 
provided additional funding to districts with greater numbers of 
disadvantaged students, and 14 states 
provided less funding to such districts. 
In short, a sizable majority of states 
have failed to provide equitable fund-
ing. These funding inequities provide 
second-rate educational opportunities 
to many low-income children that 
adversely affect their life chances. 
Third, just as Plessy resulted in 
depriving African Americans of access 
to the schools, jobs, ballots, and oppor-
tunities they needed to fully and equally 
participate in American life, the dis-
parities that Rodriguez tolerates leave 
many students without the education 
they need to so participate. Rodriguez 
effectively foreclosed federal litigation 
as a mechanism for addressing ineq-
uitable disparities in school funding, 
and Congress has been unwilling to 
demand that states remedy such dis-
parities. The individual and societal toll 
is clear: Those who attend inadequate 
schools are hampered in becoming fully 
engaged citizens. Workers who are less educated are less produc-
tive. Lower educational attainment increases criminal activity. In 
contrast, effective education significantly increases voting and 
civic engagement. Because education serves as the gateway to 
full participation and success in American society, Rodriguez 
contributes to many students being shut out.  
Although the Rodriguez court trusted states to ensure equal 
educational opportunity, this trust has proven misplaced. Even 
when students and their families have been successful in school 
funding litigation based on state constitutions, many state law-
makers have resisted and evaded court mandates to provide equi-
table or adequate funding. Until we change this reality, students at 
all income levels will continue to perform poorly in comparison 
to their international peers. 
Constitutional Claims
The Supreme Court could rely on a variety of constitutional 
protections in affirming a constitutional right to education. It 
could find that the equal protection clause prohibits wide within-
state disparities in educational opportunity that disadvantage 
some students because they live in a property-poor district, as 
Justice Thurgood Marshall argued in his Rodriguez dissent. Given 
the Constitution’s protection of the right to vote, the equal protec-
tion clause also would support a federal right to an education that 
prepares students to be competent voters and civic participants—
enabling them, for instance, to comprehend complex ballot initia-
tives and serve competently on a jury, as education law scholar 
and litigator Michael Rebell has contended. The court might also 
invoke the citizenship clause, asserting 
that all children need an education suf-
ficient to ensure equal citizenship, which 
entails political, civil, and social equal-
ity, as California Supreme Court Justice 
Goodwin Liu has argued. 
The court could emphasize that in 
a number of past decisions it has rec-
ognized “unenumerated” rights, that is, 
rights that are not explicitly included in 
the Constitution. For instance, before 
Rodriguez, the court recognized the right 
to interstate travel; the right of a parent 
to control a child’s education; the right 
to marry a person of a different race; 
and a woman’s right to terminate a preg-
nancy. Since Rodriguez, the court has 
continued to demonstrate a willingness 
to recognize and expand unenumerated 
rights—implying a right to consensual 
same-sex relationships; implying a 
parent’s right to the care, custody, and 
control of their child; and extending the 
right to reproductive privacy to minors. 
Most recently, the court held in Obergefell v. Hodges that same-sex 
couples enjoy a constitutionally protected right to marry within 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection and due process 
clauses. These cases confirm the insights of leading constitutional 
law scholar Akhil Amar, who has stated that various implicit rights, 
though unenumerated, “are nonetheless full-fledged constitutional 
entitlements on any sensible reading of the document.” 
Enforcing the Right
Once the court recognizes a federal constitutional right to 
education, families, advocates, and attorneys must begin the 
hard work of challenging state systems of education as unlaw-
ful under the U.S. Constitution. Federal courts should insist 
that states design their education systems to accomplish the 
aims of the right to education—be they ending inequitable 
disparities in educational opportunity, preparing students to 
be competent voters and civic participants, or ensuring that 
students are equal citizens. State-level (continued on page 76)
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options and invoke a “fundamental 
right to a minimally adequate edu-
cation.” The Michigan plaintiffs, in 
Gary B. v. Snyder, challenge alleged 
deficiencies in the Detroit public schools and contend that “lit-
eracy is a fundamental right.”
These attempts to revisit Rodriguez are misguided. For 
one thing, the Michigan plaintiffs rely on arguments that 
the Supreme Court has already rejected. Regardless of their 
contention that literacy is “uniquely significant to American 
civil life” because of its role in a 
“well-functioning democracy,” the 
Rodriguez court held that “the key 
to discovering whether education 
is ‘fundamental’ is not to be found 
in comparisons of the relative soci-
etal significance of education”; the 
question is “whether there is a right 
to education explicitly or implicitly 
guaranteed by the Constitution.”
Creating a federal right to educa-
tion would also force federal courts 
to take on issues they are not well-
equipped to address. School fund-
ing cases are complicated enough for 
state courts, even with state constitu-
tional education clauses to interpret. 
Indeed, because of differing language 
in the various state constitutions, state 
courts have reached a variety of con-
clusions about their ability to adjudi-
cate claims involving the “equity” or 
“adequacy” of public school systems. 
If federal courts undertook a similar 
journey unmoored from any consti-
tutional text, “it would be difficult,” 
as the Supreme Court cautioned in 
Rodriguez, “to imagine a case hav-
ing a greater potential impact on our 
federal system.”
The Rodriguez court further recog-
nized that efforts to make education 
a federal right overlook “persistent 
and difficult questions of educa-
tional policy, another area in which [the federal courts’] lack of 
specialized knowledge and experience counsels against 
premature interference with the informed judgments made 
at the state and local levels.” And despite 40 years of inter-
vening social-science research, the academic and policy 
debates described in Rodriguez continue today. Compare 
the Rodriguez court’s references to a questionable “correla-
tion between educational expenditures and the quality of 
education” with the following discussion by the Supreme 
Court of Texas in a 2016 adequacy decision:
Some amici curiae have filed Brandeis briefs citing 
recent studies going both ways on the issue of whether 
more spending means a better education.  .  .  . Courts 
should not sit as a super-legislature. Nor should they 
assume the role of super-laboratory. They are not 
equipped to resolve intractable disagreements on  
fundamental questions in the social sciences. Arthur 
Miller may have referred to a trial as the crucible, but we 
doubt he saw it as the best place 
for reducing scientific truth when 
the scientific community itself 
has reached an impasse.
The Rodriguez court anticipated 
this problem when it held that federal 
judges should “refrain from imposing 
on the States inflexible constitutional 
restraints that could circumscribe or 
handicap the continued research and 
experimentation so vital to finding 
even partial solutions to educational 
problems and to keeping abreast of 
ever-changing conditions.” Rodriguez 
thus belongs to a long line of federal 
cases emphasizing the value of state 
and local control over public educa-
tion. Even in the desegregation con-
text—where state actions are subject 
to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth 
Amendment—the Supreme Court 
held in Freeman v. Pitts that “returning 
schools to the control of local authori-
ties at the earliest practicable date is 
essential to restore their true account-
ability in our governmental system.”
Hence, the lack of supporting con-
stitutional text, principles of federal-
ism, and the doctrine of stare decisis 
(which lends stability to the law by 
encouraging courts to stand by their 
prior decisions) all militate against 
the creation of a federal constitutional 
right to education or to supposedly equal school funding. Plaintiffs 
who are unable to achieve their policy goals through state and 
local political processes should not be allowed to impose their 
preferences by federal judicial fiat.
Unanswered Questions
But even if Rodriguez had been wrongly decided, defining 
a federal right to education in a way (continued on page 77)
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funding litigation has often revealed 
that education systems are based upon 
the bargains struck by politicians that 
are divorced from a rigorous analysis 
of the aims of education and the best means to achieve them. In 
designing remedies, the federal courts could draw critical lessons 
from successful state cases such as Abbott v. Burke (New Jersey) 
and Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York. Both cases 
provide examples of state courts that 
have insisted that states design funding 
systems to accomplish specified aims. 
Cases alleging a federal constitutional 
right to education need not center on 
the illegality of funding disparities. Such 
cases can cause courts to lose their focus 
on the underlying disparities in educa-
tional opportunity that prevent children 
from becoming engaged citizens and 
productive members of society. When 
cases do implicate funding disparities, 
the federal courts can build upon the 
consensus that has emerged from the 
overwhelming majority of state courts 
that have concluded, after a review of 
the relevant social science research, 
that money does matter for the qual-
ity of educational opportunity. Recent 
research by C. Kirabo Jackson and col-
leagues confirms that spending increases 
can improve both educational and adult 
outcomes for low-income children (see 
“Boosting Educational Attainment and 
Adult Earnings,” research, Fall 2015). 
Therefore, although the Rodriguez court 
noted that it was unable to address com-
plex policy questions such as this, the 
Supreme Court would not be stymied 
by this question in future cases. 
When enforcing a constitutional right to education, federal 
courts should establish clear guidance about what that right 
requires, while also allowing for flexibility in how states implement 
it. State funding and governance mechanisms vary. Therefore, 
federal courts should eschew simple one-size-fits-all remedies 
such as mandating equal per-pupil funding. States should be 
able to continue to serve as laboratories of experimentation and 
innovation that decide how best to provide the right to education. 
However, these laboratories should operate within federal limits 
that protect the national interest in a well-educated populace. This 
approach would provide federal accountability while retaining the 
beneficial aspects of state and local control. 
Ultimately, what we are calling for is a long-overdue restructur-
ing of education federalism to establish an effective partnership of 
the federal, state, and local governments to advance equal access 
to an excellent education. Education federalism has served as a 
consistent roadblock to federal efforts to remove barriers to equal 
educational opportunities for low-income and minority students. 
The oft-praised benefits of state and local control—experimenta-
tion, innovation, and competition for excellence—have failed to 
eliminate the substandard schools that many children attend. 
Instead, trumpeting the importance of state and local control 
has too often served as a vehicle for 
those privileged by the current educa-
tion system to maintain their advantage 
and avoid accountability for effectively 
educating all children. 
Education federalism has already 
undergone a tremendous evolution since 
the Brown decision and its progeny and 
passage of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965 (ESEA). Successive 
reauthorizations of ESEA have revealed 
the need for federal accountability to 
incentivize states and localities to enact 
K–12 education reforms. Even the Every 
Student Succeeds Act, the law’s 2015 
iteration, which reduces the federal role 
in school accountability, still insists that 
state and local governments focus atten-
tion on the lowest-performing schools. 
This demonstrates Congress’s continuing 
concern that states and localities often 
do not intervene in ways that can break 
long-standing cycles of low graduation 
rates and lagging achievement. 
Undoubtedly, the litigation we envi-
sion will impose costs on the federal, 
state, and local governments. Yet the 
United States already bears costs from 
our broken education system, includ-
ing higher crime rates, additional expenses for health-care and 
public-assistance programs, and lost tax revenue as well as the 
untold costs of telling generations of children in chronically 
under-resourced, low-performing schools: “You don’t matter!” 
As states receive the message that they must provide equal access 
to an excellent education, the litigation costs will subside while 
the benefits to our nation will continue to accrue and multiply 
for generations.
Recognition of a federal constitutional right to education will 
provide us with a clear path to excellent and equitable schools. 
Just as the court declared an end to separate but equal in Brown 
v. Board of Education, the court must also declare an end to a 
third-world education for some and a world-class education for 
others by overturning Rodriguez. Our national commitment to 
equal opportunity and a just society demands no less. n
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that guarantees “equal educational 
opportunity” would be no easy task 
and would raise more questions 
than it answered.
For example, should equality be gauged by the financial 
resources made available to public schools? How far would 
states have to go to equalize these educational inputs? Would 
providing greater base funding suffice, or would states have 
to go further to prohibit additional 
“unequal” spending by local school 
districts? Would the federal govern-
ment have its own affirmative duty 
to provide additional federal funds—
which currently make up less than 
10 percent of all nationwide fund-
ing for K–12 education? And would 
Congress need to equalize spending 
across states?
Arguments to equalize funding 
ignore the reality that in many places, 
schools with concentrations of poor 
or academically struggling students 
already receive at least as much 
funding per pupil as other schools. 
Even the Education Law Center, 
an advocacy organization that sup-
ports plaintiffs seeking “fair” (that 
is, more) public-education funding, 
recently reported that two-thirds of 
the states provide equal or “progres-
sive” funding for high-poverty school 
districts. Particularly in large urban 
districts, funding levels for disad-
vantaged or struggling students are 
often more than equal. Should those 
targeted funding differences be held 
unconstitutional? Or would “equal 
educational opportunity” require even 
more unequal spending, as Professors 
Ogletree and Robinson argue in their 
companion essay? 
If equalized funding is not the answer, should states 
instead be forced to equalize student outcomes? Setting aside 
practical and policy questions about how to accomplish that 
goal, serious questions about the proper “aims of education” 
cited by Ogletree and Robinson remain unsettled. Which 
outcomes should be measured, and how “equal” must they 
be? Should courts consider test scores, classroom grades, 
or graduation rates? If the stubborn achievement gaps that 
exist in every state could prove a violation of federal equal-
protection rights, would federal courts have to monitor every 
state’s education policies and spending decisions?
Asking federal courts to wade into these thickets is a mis-
take. State officials and courts have already grappled with 
many of these issues, and creating a federal right to education 
would destabilize policies and decisions that have shaped local 
school systems for generations. On this point, the Rodriguez 
court observed that the school-funding systems in Texas 
and “virtually every other state [would] not pass muster” 
under strict federal judicial scrutiny. “Nor indeed,” the court 
explained, “in view of the infinite 
variables affecting the educational 
process, can any system assure equal 
quality of education except in the 
most relative sense.”
Proponents of a federal right 
to education presume that federal 
judges would succeed where local 
policymakers have supposedly 
failed. But the federal judiciary 
lacks the capacity and expertise to 
solve entrenched problems like the 
achievement gap from the bench. 
Federal judges are not school super-
intendents, education experts, or 
central planners. What evidence 
shows that federal courts would 
produce better results than the state 
and local governments that have 
been designing and experimenting 
with education policy for years? And 
what benchmarks would allow the 
federal courts to decide when they 
had achieved the amorphous goal 
of “equal educational opportunity”? 
Numerous racial-desegregation 
cases, in which the goal of integra-
tion to remedy intentional discrimi-
nation is relatively clear, have lasted 
for decades. Adding constitutional 
equity and adequacy claims to the 
federal dockets, in the service of an 
implicit right to education, could lead to an era of federal 
judicial supervision with no end in sight.
It may well be the case that additional funds devoted to 
particular policies could improve certain facets of American 
public education. But the Rodriguez court correctly held that 
because “the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies 
for every social and economic ill,” broad educational goals 
are “not values to be implemented by judicial intrusion into 
otherwise legitimate state activities.” Given the substantial 
risks (and uncertain rewards) of federal judicial intervention, 
any acknowledgment of constitutional rights to education 
should be left to the states.  n
Proponents  
of a federal right  
to education  
presume that 
 federal judges 
would succeed where 
local policymakers 
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But the federal  
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